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ABSTRACT 
Pavel Nitchovski: “Hello, Clarice.” (A Step) Towards a Philosophical Account of Intimacy 
(Under the direction of Susan Wolf, C.D.C. Reeve, and Gerald Postema) 
 
Despite the importance that many people today place on intimacy, there has been surprisingly 
little philosophical work done on the topic. This essay attempts to partially fill this lacuna by 
offering an account of some characteristic features of intimate interactions and providing the 
beginning steps towards a more nuanced view of intimacy. In short, the claim I will defend is 
that intimate interactions between people generally involve an instance of disclosure about 
something personal (by at least one person involved in the interaction) that is picked up by an 
empathetic individual, resulting in a specific kind of understanding of what’s being shared, and 
that is marked with a shared recognition that this kind of understanding has occurred. I’ll develop 
this point by looking at a few of the existing accounts of intimacy and a specific example from 
film. 
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I. Introduction 
Few people doubt that close personal relationships are part of the good life. What 
Aristotle pointed out some two-thousand years ago remains true: nobody would choose to live 
without friends. Nor would anyone, I suspect, choose to live without being loved. A life devoid 
of companionship of either kind is rarely worth living. This much seems uncontroversial. 
Perhaps more controversial, however, is the relatively modern notion that intimacy is 
important for having the kind of friendship and love affairs that make life good. This notion 
appears in two guises. In its strong form, it claims that intimacy is necessary for forming 
meaningful friendships and loving relationships such that impediments to intimacy are 
impediments to love and friendship, and an inability to facilitate and cultivate intimacy directly 
translates into an ability to love and be a friend. Thus, for example, we are told that men have 
difficulty forming meaningful friendships with other men because they lack the skills to be 
intimate with each other.1 The same, we are told, applies to the person who is utterly incapable of 
being intimate with his or her lover. In both domains, intimacy is of utmost importance.  
In its weaker form, the claim is not that intimacy is necessary for friendships and loving 
relationships, but that intimate friendships and intimate loving relationships are better than those 
that lack intimacy. In this sense, we may have plenty of meaningful non-intimate relationships, 
                                                          
1 See Robert A. Strikwerda and Larry May, "Male Friendship and Intimacy," Hypatia 7, no. 3 (1992): 110-125, 
doi:10.1111/j.1527-2001.1992.tb00907.x. 
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but their lack of intimacy means that these relationships aren’t as meaningful as they could be. 
Thus, men might be capable of having friendships with one another, but if they’re incapable of 
forming intimate friendships, then they’re denying themselves the possibility of something even 
more valuable. Intimacy in this sense allows for development and improvement of something 
that’s already good in our lives into something better. 
In both of its guises the general idea around the importance of intimacy seems to be that, 
at the very least, intimacy is a distinct, non-substitutable good in life. Of course, this claim that 
intimacy is good—or, more accurately, that it’s always good—may be false. In many (if not all) 
cases it seems that being intimate with someone requires being vulnerable or exposed to another, 
and all vulnerability carries with it the risk of abuse and harm. Thus, it may turn out that 
although intimacy is usually a good that improves friendships and romantic relationships, it can 
also be exploited to make people much worse off than they would have been had they not 
become intimate. In such cases it may turn out that rather than inviting and cultivating intimacy, 
we should try to inhibit and prevent it from developing. In any case, it seems that before we can 
begin to address the question of when intimacy is good and why we have to be able to say 
something about what intimacy is. 
Curiously, little philosophical attention has been devoted to the topic.2 This is even more 
surprising given the fact that there is a deep philosophical tradition in the two areas where 
                                                          
2 An exception to this is Christopher Laurel’s. Intimacy: A Dialectical Study. Although it is a very engaging piece of 
philosophy, I will not be able to address Laurel’s book in this study for two reasons. The first is that the book is 
primarily concerned with defending and explaining the claim that intimacy, as defined by Laurel, is impossible to 
achieve. By contrast, I begin by tacitly assuming that intimacy is indeed possible to achieve and am interested in 
figuring out what elements are at play when it is achieved. Therefore, Laurel and I begin our projects at different 
starting points. The second reason I don’t engage with the work in depth is because Laurel’s dialectical 
methodology is one that I’m not terribly familiar with. That’s not to say that this methodology is inappropriate, but 
rather, that my lack of expertise therein leaves me with little to say.    
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intimacy seems to be of utmost importance to us today: friendship and love. Take as just two 
examples Plato’s account of love in the Symposium and Aristotle’s account of friendship in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Not only does neither author explicitly mention intimacy in his respective 
account, but it’s also hard to see where intimacy would fit in if we tried looking for it: Plato’s 
account of love is about knowledge of the good and beautiful; Aristotle’s account of friendship is 
about equality in virtue.3 What role intimacy plays in either account (if any at all!) remains 
obscure. The same can be said for contemporary theories of love and friendship as well (with the 
exception that modern accounts will occasionally use the words ‘intimate’ and ‘intimacy’ as a 
synonym for ‘close’ and ‘closeness’). There are two notable contemporary exceptions. The first 
is Christopher Laurel’s book Intimacy: A Dialectical Study which, unfortunately, I will not be 
able to discuss here (see footnote 2). And the second is the account of intimacy offered by Robert 
Strikwerda and Larry May—this account will be addressed in the next section. 
This general lapse may be explained in several ways. First, it’s possible that philosophers 
of friendship and love have simply found the concept of intimacy to be so intuitive as not to 
require any further explanation. This strikes me as unlikely—few things in philosophy (if any!) 
are so intuitive, and intimacy doesn’t seem to be one of them. In any case, it doesn’t strike me as 
obviously intuitive what intimacy consist of, and I suspect I’m not alone. 
It’s also possible that this lapse in the literature could be explained by the fact, to which I 
alluded earlier, that the importance of intimacy in relationships seems to be relatively recent.4 
Thus, the reason Plato and Aristotle don’t talk about intimacy in their accounts could be because 
                                                          
3 These are, of course, very, very simplified bumper-sticker summaries.  
4 Its importance may also be culturally relative—it does, for example, appear to be a largely western phenomenon. 
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they just didn’t think of it as something important (if they thought about it at all!). More 
radically, it’s also possible that just like the notion of romantic love, there simply wasn’t a 
concept of intimacy until very recently. The relative lack of attention to intimacy in modern 
work, then, might be explained by following the deep philosophical traditions set in place during 
a time at which our modern concepts didn’t exist. This, too, doesn’t strike me as implausible, but 
it would require research that is well beyond the scope of this project. Regardless, the truth of 
this hypothesis would still leave us with the question of whether intimacy is important to us, and 
answering this question in either direction would require us to know what we’re talking about 
when we talk about intimacy.  
The goal of this paper is to begin to fill this philosophical lacuna by providing the first 
steps towards an account of intimacy. For reasons of time and space I will not be able to provide 
a full account of intimacy, but will only focus on what makes specific interactions between 
individuals intimate. In taking this approach I’m making an important methodological choice 
about how to engage with the topic. Specifically, I’m making the claim that intimacy can be 
found in two domains: interactions and relationships, with the important distinction between the 
two being that, generally speaking, interactions can occur between people who are not in an 
existing relationship and that relationships can be in place without the presence of any specific 
interaction. The hope is that if we can get a good grasp of what makes certain interactions 
intimate, we will also be in a better position to explain what makes certain relationships intimate.   
The claim I will ultimately defend is that intimate interactions involve three elements: 
verbal or nonverbal disclosure, empathy, and a mutual recognition of understanding. It’s worth 
noting at the outset that these elements are not necessary and sufficient conditions for intimate 
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interactions and I don’t intend to treat them as such. Rather, they are important features at the 
core of intimate interactions that can give us a greater understanding of intimacy.  
The structure of the essay will be as follows. I begin by first looking at what I take to be a 
commonly held folk view about intimate interactions—namely, the view that intimacy is, at its 
core, about sharing meaningful information about one’s thoughts and feelings through deep 
conversations; I call this “the common view.” I will argue that while the common view points to 
something true about intimate interactions—viz., it involves disclosure—it is too narrow to serve 
as a general account thereof. Following, I will discuss two more sophisticated accounts. The first 
is by philosophers Roberts Strikwerda and Larry May and the second is by psychologists Karen 
Prager and Linda Roberts. These two accounts do better than the common view and take us 
closer to the heart of intimacy, but, I argue, they don’t go far enough. I will then take an in depth 
look at an intimate interaction that proves to be a difficult case for both of the sophisticated 
accounts, and use it to offer my own analysis. Finally, after developing this analysis, I will show 
how the account I’ve offered preserves what was initially appealing about the three views in 
question while furthering our understanding of intimacy.  
II. Three Views 
In what follows I will explore three different views on intimacy, each of which gets 
something right about what makes a particular interaction intimate. My goal in engaging in this 
exploration will be to be as promiscuous as possible, picking up whatever it is from each view 
that is valuable in getting a better understanding of intimacy and leaving the rest behind. Thus, 
the movement from one account to another should not be seen as a rejection or refutation of that 
account, but rather as an indication of having picked up what I find to be useful.  
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a. The Common View 
We can do worse in beginning our exploration of intimacy than to look at what strikes me 
as a commonly held view of intimacy. On this view, intimacy is achieved between two people 
who care about each other when they talk about their personal feelings, deepest desires, and 
highest aspirations. It is a state achieved through self-revealing verbal discourse in which the 
individuals are brought closer to one another by disclosing private matters. On this view, 
intimacy is a matter of verbal communication and positive affect for one another: I, who care 
about you, tell you about me—the real me—and what matters to me, and you, who also cares 
about me, tell me about what matters to you, and by learning about each other through our 
conversation our intimacy grows. Of course, we may do other things as well. If we’re lovers we 
may also have sex, and if we’re friends we may also go out drinking—but these activities are 
incidental to how intimate we ultimately become (after all, sex doesn’t have to be intimate, and 
drinking together is as likely to lead to violence as to intimacy). It is only when these activities 
also involve (or precede or are followed by) discourse that the interactions they constitute 
become intimate ones for us. 
 This account is plausible and may seem to capture many of our initial intuitions on the 
matter. There really are many instances in which self-disclosure between people who like each 
other is rightly considered to be intimate. Furthermore, many of these instances really are cases 
in which we think of the interaction as intimate precisely because it involved discourse and 
disclosure. So, the common view isn’t entirely mistaken. However, it can’t be the whole story 
since verbal self-disclosure—whether it comes in the form of talking about oneself, one’s 
feelings, or one’s hopes—can be just as much of an impediment to intimacy as a means of 
achieving it. This is especially the case if what is revealed is particularly personal. Disclosing to 
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a stranger that you’ve been crying every day since your wife left or that you deeply hope she’s 
miserable with her new husband is just as likely to push someone away as it is to bring them 
closer. Even if the other person isn’t a stranger and cares about you, deeply personal revelations 
can become insurmountable barriers for intimacy—perhaps permanently so.  
 Furthermore, there appear to be some interactions that can be deeply intimate without any 
kind of verbal disclosure. Consider, for example, the following quote about the intimacy of 
boxing: 
Boxing is a sport full of intimacy. Intimacy with self and others. It brings us closer to 
ourselves. We head into the ring to descend into the depths of personal fear and unknowns 
and when we come out, we have a deeper understanding of who we are. We suffer in 
training to discover the gaps in our will and desire. We want to know these gaps at the 
deepest level, so when tested we can cross these gaps without thought.5 
Clearly, if boxing can constitute an intimate interaction, the intimacy is not to be explained by 
the depth of verbal discourse that goes on between the competitors, but by something else. 
 The author of the quote attributes the intimacy between two boxers to self-knowledge 
gained by engaging in the sport. This is a substantial thesis that we may ultimately want to reject, 
but the point still remains that if such an interaction can be intimate, then what makes it so will 
have to be put in terms of something other than verbal discourse. Of course, people may reject 
the claim that boxing can ever be an intimate experience, but I see no a priori reason to think that 
it shouldn’t be—especially given the fact that at least some people do seem to find it to be such. 
 It also seems safe to say that, at least sometimes, sex can be intimate, and when it is, it is 
usually not because of what is said between the people involved. Rather, it is because of the 
                                                          
5 Arcaro Boxing Gym. “The intimacy in boxing,” Arcaro Boxing Gym (blog), July 19, 2016, 
https://arcaroboxing.com/2016/07/19/the-intimacy-in-boxing/. 
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nature of the sexual interaction, the people who are involved, whether they like one another, and 
so on. It is these conditions that seem important to making the activity intimate and it is these 
conditions that the common view seems ill-fitted to accommodate.  
b. Strikwerda and May: Intimate Friendships 
Given these considerations, it seems clear that what I’ve called the common view will not 
be sufficient for a more general account of intimate interactions. Here, we can turn to the more 
sophisticated accounts offered by Strikwerda and May and Prager and Roberts. Let’s begin with 
Strikwerda and May whose account is primarily concerned with intimacy in friendships.  
 Like the common view, Strikwerda and May’s account holds that that intimacy in 
friendship involves some kind of self-disclosure. However, it states that for intimacy to occur 
between friends, this self-disclosure must be coupled with four additional elements: knowledge, 
positive feelings, trust, and reciprocity. Let’s look at each of these. First, Strikwerda and May 
claim that intimate friendship requires “a deep and or intense mutual knowledge that allows the 
participants to grow in both self-understanding and understanding of others. That understanding 
includes the defining personal characteristics of an individual, conjoined with enjoyment of and 
loyalty to that person.”6 The ‘knowledge’ element, then, denotes knowledge of a specific type—
it is mutual knowledge of the other person’s defining characteristics that leads to a broad 
understanding of self and others. Thus, my knowing your shoe size wouldn’t count as knowledge 
                                                          
6 Strikwerda and May, 115. 
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of the relevant type (in most conceivable contexts), but my knowing something about your 
commitment to hard work might.7 
 Second, intimacy in friendships on Strikwerda and May’s account has to involve some 
sorts of positive feelings from both parties about the other. Part of this was already referenced in 
the discussion of the first element when we mentioned that the deep knowledge must be coupled 
with an “enjoyment of and loyalty to that person.” Unfortunately, Strikwerda and May don’t’ go 
into too much detail beyond this with respect to what kinds of feelings count as positive ones. 
Nevertheless, two kinds of relationships seem to be ruled out with the stipulation of this element: 
namely, those relationships in which individuals have negative feelings towards one another, and 
those relationships in which they feel indifferent towards one another. Given how odd it sounds 
to say that two people can have an intimate friendship despite the fact that they hate each other or 
feel indifferently about each other, this seems correct. 
 Third, and as Strikwerda and May stress, “perhaps the most significant step in friendship 
is the achievement of a mutual trust based on some form of shared experience.”8 This trust, they 
claim, is usually built up slowly over a long period of time and “engenders a corresponding 
loyalty and a further relaxation to heighten each other’s enjoyment of shared activities.”9 
Finally, on Strikwerda and May’s account each of these three elements must involve 
reciprocal behaviors. Hence, we can add the fourth element, reciprocity. We cannot be intimate 
                                                          
7 It’s not clear whether one’s loyalty or enjoyment needs to be grounded in my knowledge of your defining 
characteristics or if this is independent of this knowledge. Strikwerda and May leave this ambiguous. Presumably, 
however, I might enjoy your company and be loyal to you despite, say, your pig-headed streak. 
    
8 Strikwerda and May, 115. 
9 Ibid., 116. 
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friends if only you have deep knowledge of me, if only you feel positively about me, or if only 
you trust me. In order for our friendship to be intimate we must both meet the specified 
conditions; there is no one-sided intimacy on this account.10 When these four elements are 
present in an instance of self-disclosure it constitutes “a form of mutual enclosure in which two 
selves create a new, inclusive focus of attention.”11  
 The conditions specified by Strikwerda and May’s account do seem to get something 
right. It really does seem plausible to say that friends who disclose things about themselves under 
these conditions will be intimate ones and that such instances of disclosure will be intimate. 
Furthermore, the account allows us to fill in some of the gaps left by the common view. 
Specifically, it allows us to specify the conditions under which self-disclosure will not lead to 
intimacy—if self-disclosure is performed in a context in which the friends in question don’t trust 
each other, don’t have deep knowledge of each other, don’t like each other, or don’t reciprocate 
in their discourse, then that self-disclosure will not be an intimate one. Thus, we can understand 
why sometimes verbal self-disclosure can push people away instead of bringing them closer. In 
that respect, this more sophisticated view does better than the common view while preserving 
what was appealing about it. 
 That being said, it’s worth noting that Strikwerda and May’s account is narrowly focused 
on what kind of interactions make for intimate friendships. Thus, it is an account already situated 
within a specific and established relationship. What we’re interested in, however, is the more 
                                                          
10 This makes sense given that there's no such thing as a one-sided friendship.  
11 Ibid., 116. Strikwerda and May explain this as what makes an instance of self-disclosure intimate, but it’s not 
clear whether they mean this to be a general description of what would make any such instance intimate, or 
whether it is only what would make an instance of self-disclosure intimate among friends. Given the aim of their 
paper, I have treated them as meaning the former. However, I will shortly consider whether they could also mean 
the latter. 
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general question of what would make any individual interaction intimate, regardless of whether 
the people interacting are already friends. Strikwerda and May’s account doesn’t answer this 
question (nor does it claim to—this isn’t a strike against their view!). That being said, we may be 
able to extend their view and say that an interaction will be intimate between any people as long 
as the four elements specified here are met. 
 This suggestion is plausible, but it strikes me as too strong. Specifically, the elements of 
trust and mutual knowledge seem so demanding that they appear to make the possibility for an 
intimate interaction outside the context of an already established relationship virtually 
impossible. For example, if what’s required for an intimate interaction really is “a deep and or 
intense mutual knowledge that allows the participants to grow in both self-understanding and 
understanding of others…conjoined with enjoyment and loyalty to that person” then it seems 
extremely likely that only my friends (and even then, only a select few of them) will be people 
with whom I could have intimate interactions. Acquaintances, strangers, new romantic partners, 
or, more generally, people with whom one isn’t already in an established relationship simply 
won’t be eligible. One way of putting the worry, then, is that the conditions that such an 
extended account stipulate would simply be a restatement of what it takes to have an intimate 
interaction between friends.  
 Now, that’s not to say that such an extended view would necessarily be wrong. However, 
it seems to me that adopting it would require that one be committed to the claim that, in general, 
all intimate interactions are like the intimate interactions between friends. And this further claim 
strikes me as dubious. Indeed, the boxing example we looked at in section a) (to the extent that it 
strikes one as a plausible instance of an intimate interaction) gives us some reason to suspect that 
not every intimate interaction looks like one that might occur between friends. If boxing can be 
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an intimate interaction, then it’s presumably not because the boxers feel loyalty to one another, 
trust each other in any sense but the bare minimum (i.e. that the other person won’t kill them in 
the ring), or have deep knowledge of each other’s personally defining characteristics. It may be 
true that in some circumstances—if the boxers were also friends, for example—such factors may 
explain the intimacy between them, but if we think that their fight can be an intimate interaction 
even if they’re not friends, then we may want to look elsewhere. 
 I want to stress that the fact that I find this extended account lacking is not a strike against 
Strikwerda and May’s theory. Strictly speaking, the extended account is not their account, and, 
as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, the one they offer is one that is explicitly 
concerned with offering an account of intimacy with the context of a friendship. Their account 
may very well be correct in that narrow scope and I don’t want to suggest otherwise. But given 
that we are interested in a more general account of what makes any interaction intimate, its 
narrow scope is sufficient reason to continue exploring.    
c. Prager and Roberts: Conditions for Intimate Interactions 
An account that better engages with the task we’ve set for ourselves here is the account 
offered by psychologists Karen Prager and Linda Roberts. This account is especially useful since 
it makes the explicit distinction between intimate interactions and intimate relationships and 
offers separate necessary and sufficient conditions for both. Here, I will only focus on the 
necessary and sufficient conditions specified for intimate interactions. They are as follows:  
i) The interaction must involve some self-revealing behavior (either verbal or 
nonverbal); i.e. the interaction must involve some form of disclosure.  
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ii) The individuals involved must “be in a state of positive involvement with one 
another.”12 
iii) The interaction must be “characterized by shared understanding of one another’s 
selves.”13 
When an interaction has these three features, at least some degree of interactional intimacy is 
present. Precisely how intimate any given interaction is can be described as a function of how 
self-revealing the behavior in question is, the strength of the positive involvement, and the extent 
to which both parties understand one another.14 Crucially, since the three conditions are 
necessary and jointly sufficient for an intimate interaction, no interaction that fails to meet one of 
the three conditions can be considered an intimate one on the Prager/Roberts account. 
 On its face, this view appears to share may features with the Strikwerda and May 
account. Roughly, we might say that Strikwerda and May’s ‘knowledge’ element maps onto 
condition iii), that condition ii) covers the elements of ‘positive feelings’ and ‘trust’, and that 
Strikwerda and May’s concern with self-disclosure is covered by condition i) with the additional 
element that nonverbal disclosure is now at play. That being said, if this mapping were exact, 
then Prager and Roberts’ account will run into the same problem as Strikwerda and May’s. That 
account, recall, was ill suited as a general account of intimate interactions because it required 
                                                          
12 Karen J. Prager and Linda J. Roberts, "Deep Intimate Connection: Self and Intimacy in Couple Relationships," in 
Handbook of Closeness and Intimacy, ed. Debra J. Mashek and Arthur Aron (New York: Routledge, 2013), 45. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Their account of intimate relationships is built out of this account of intimate interactions. Briefly, intimate 
relationships are ones in which intimate interactions occur frequently and reliably. I disagree with this view since it 
seems to me that one can be in an intimate relationship in which intimate interactions occur very rarely or 
occurred once, but no longer. I lack the space to expand on this point at this moment.  
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that the individuals involved be in a state of mutual trust earned over a long period of time, 
mutual deep knowledge, and a sense of loyalty, that seemed to exclude anyone but a few close 
friends as people with whom one could be intimate. If Prager and Roberts’ account is to do 
better, then the threshold for meeting conditions ii) and iii) must be weaker than Strikwerda and 
May’s corresponding conditions. 
 To that end, we can take a closer look at Prager and Roberts’ understanding of those two 
conditions. We can begin by asking what it means for two individuals to be in “a state of positive 
involvement with one another.” On Prager and Roberts’ account, a person’s involvement is a 
matter of being attentive and engaged in the interaction as it unfolds. A distracted or unfocused 
conversational partner, for example, is not involved in the conversation while someone who is 
actively listening and paying close attention to what is being said is highly involved. A person is 
also positively engaged in an interaction to the extent that he has, and is communicating, ‘basic 
positive regard’ for the other person through verbal or non-verbal cues. Thus, someone who is in 
a state of positive involvement with a conversation partner will not only be focused and listen, 
but will also communicate her positive regard for his partner by verbalizing it, or by giving cues 
to that effect through his body language (eye contact, direct body orientation, nodding, etc.). If 
both partners are in such a state, then their interaction has met the second condition for an 
intimate interaction.15 
                                                          
15 It’s worth noting that positive involvement does not imply positive affect. What’s important to communicate to 
the other is not that one is happy or having a good time, but rather their positive regard for their partner. This can 
be done even if, for example, the two are having an unpleasant conversation. For example, we might both be 
despondent while talking about the death of a mutual friend and still be positively involved in our interaction. 
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 This explanation is somewhat hindered by the fact that Prager and Roberts don’t tell us 
what it means for someone to have a basic positive regard for another person. However, it seems 
clear that whatever it is, basic positive regard does not require trust and loyalty cultivated over 
years of familiarity; it’s reasonable to say that one can have basic positive regard for someone 
one doesn’t know well, but less so with respect to trust or loyalty. If this is correct, then Prager 
and Roberts can account for intimacy between two boxers who know nothing about each other 
and who don’t say much of anything to one another as long as both are sufficiently involved in 
the activity. 
 The matter is a bit more complicated with respect to explaining condition iii) which 
specifies that the interaction must be “characterized by shared understanding of one another’s 
selves.” Unfortunately, Prager and Roberts say very little about what this might mean. Explicitly, 
they say the following:  
In an intimate interaction, both partners experience a sense of knowing or 
understanding some aspect of the other’s inner experience—from private thoughts, 
feelings or beliefs, to characteristic rhythms, habits, or routines, to private sexual 
fantasies and preferences.16 
This passage suggests that the third condition is met when the two partners have an experience or 
sense of understanding or knowing something about the other. In turn, it suggests that intimate 
interactions require both partners to feel like they understand something about the other person 
and not that they actually understand something about them. But this reading seems much too 
weak. If right, it would force us to accept that cases in which one person convincingly 
misrepresents himself with the result that his partner feels they understand him will count as an 
                                                          
16 Prager and Roberts, 45-46. 
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intimate interaction. Simply put, if we accept iii) unaltered, interactions with con artists would be 
paradigmatic of intimate interactions.17 This seems like the wrong result. Of course, such 
interactions may very well feel intimate, but they’re mere simulations of intimacy. This becomes 
obvious when we wake the next day to find our bank accounts cleaned out and our wallets 
empty—what we thought was a night of intimacy was nothing but a ruse to get our money. 
 A better reading of Prager and Roberts’ third condition, then, might be that intimate 
interactions simply require that both partners do, in fact, come to understand or to know 
something about the other person’s inner experience. Furthermore, in many of these cases, this 
understanding will also be accompanied by the feeling of understanding. But if we are to rule out 
the intimacy that con artists try to engender with their victims as genuine cases of intimate 
interaction, then the feeling of understanding cannot be the only thing that matters. 
 If this is right, then, as with condition ii), we can see that Prager and Roberts’ criterion 
for understanding is weaker than its counterpart in Strikwerda and May’s account. While both 
accounts require that understanding or knowledge of the other is achieved, the latter requires that 
what’s understood is some deep characteristic feature of the other while the former only requires 
understanding of “some aspect of the other’s inner experience.” This allows Prager and Roberts 
to capture intimate interactions outside the context of an established relationship: I may very well 
be able to understand some aspect of your inner experience—a private sexual fantasy, a thought, 
a desire—even if I don’t know you very well, but it’s unlikely that I will be able to understand 
your deep personal characteristics unless we spend some extended period of time with one 
another. Of course, it may be possible to learn core characteristics of a person in a short time as 
                                                          
17 Assuming, of course, that the con men also feel like they understand something about us. Which they very well 
may. 
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well, but this looser condition allows for intimacy to occur in cases that fall short of such 
profound understanding. 
 While Strikwerda and May’s account may very well be a promising one for intimacy 
within the context of one particular type of relationship (viz., friendship), it is ill-suited for 
developing a more general account of intimate interactions. Prager and Roberts’ account does 
better in this respect. Furthermore, it seems compatible with Strikwerda and May’s view. Given 
that the two share similar elements and differ mostly with respect to how strict the criteria for 
satisfying their respective conditions are (i.e. depth of understanding and level or type of positive 
regard), it appears that Prager and Roberts’ view can deliver the same results as Strikwerda and 
May’s with respect to intimate interactions within friendships, and better results with respect to 
intimate interactions outside of an established relationship. Thus, nothing appears to be lost if we 
adopt the former and set the latter aside. 
 Furthermore, Prager and Roberts’ view seems to be able to account for the potential 
intimacy between two boxers that Strikwerda and May's account (or, at the very least, the 
extended version I offered) seemed ill-equipped to handle. On Prager and Roberts' view, the 
boxing match will constitute an intimate interaction for the two boxers just as long as they meet 
the three conditions. First, the two must (presumably) non-verbally disclose something to one 
another in the course of their fight. This seems plausible insofar as the two athletes are able to 
use their body language to convey something to one another through their fight (perhaps their 
desire to win or their fear of defeat at the other's hands).18 Second, they must be positively 
                                                          
18 Not being a fighter myself, I admit, I'm a bit out of my depth in speculating how and what could be 
communicated with another fighter through body language. I suspect that there may be things that fighters can 
learn from one another's postures and fighting styles that would only be available in an interaction in the ring. 
However, we don't need to take such a strong stance here. It is sufficient, I believe, that non-verbal disclosure can 
occur in general between people, that this ability to non-verbally disclose doesn't disappear once people step into 
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involved with one another during their fight. Putting aside the question of positive regard raised 
earlier, this, too, seems plausible insofar as we can imagine that the two fighters are attentive to 
one another during the fight (reasonable, given the interest each has to avoid being punched in 
the head) and insofar as they do not hold each other in utter contempt. And finally, through their 
interaction, they must come to a shared understanding of the other and themselves. This 
condition, too, seems like it may plausibly be met, and, in fact, seems to mirror the explanation 
of intimacy in the ring quoted earlier.19 
 So, we seem to be in fairly good shape. Nevertheless, in the next section I will push this 
account further with the help of an example that not only strikes me as intimate, but which puts 
pressure on Prager and Roberts’ view.  
III. A Meeting in Memphis 
The example I have in mind comes from an interaction between FBI agent Clarice 
Starling and the cannibal Dr. Hannibal Lecter in the movie The Silence of the Lambs.20 The scene 
I want to look at is the one from which the movie gets its name. For those who haven’t seen the 
movie (or who don’t remember it well) I will offer a brief synopsis before showing why it poses 
a problem for the Prager/Roberts account.21   
                                                          
the ring, and that it can be employed while the two boxers fight. And it seems to me that non-verbal 
communication can certainly occur between people—much is communicated, for example, during an intimate 
sexual encounter even if it’s never said out loud.  
19 Here's the relevant bit again: "We head into the ring to descend into the depths of personal fear and unknowns 
and when we come out, we have a deeper understanding of who we are." 
20 The Silence of the Lambs, directed by Jonathan Demme. (1991; Santa Monica, CA: MGM Home Entertainment, 
2001), DVD.  
21 The scene can also be found here: https://youtu.be/zeKqD2g9-ic 
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In the scene in question, Starling has flown to Memphis where the criminal Dr. Lecter is 
being temporarily held in a makeshift cell—a kind of iron cage surrounding a boxing ring in the 
middle of an empty exhibition hall. The deal Starling had promised him earlier in the movie has 
been shown to be a fake; Clarice never had the authority to make the promises she made. She 
had essentially tried to manipulate Lecter to get the information she needed. Whether Lecter 
knew this at the time is unclear. However, as she approaches the cell both parties are aware that 
Clarice comes with nothing to bargain: she won’t be able to do anything for Lecter one way or 
another regardless of whether he tells her anything about the serial killer Buffalo Bill. 
Nevertheless, Starling intends to convince him to help her. She has only a short time to do this 
before Dr. Chilton—Lecter’s warden—will end their meeting. 
After handing Lecter a bundle of his old drawings and acknowledging the fact that she 
tried to deceive him, Starling tells Lecter that his “anagrams are showing.” Clarice has noticed 
that the name he had given to the police as the identity of Bill—Louis Friend—is an anagram for 
Iron Sulfide (fool’s gold). Lecter has duped the police. In telling him this Clarice is proving 
herself to Lecter: what had fooled everyone else did not fool her. She is signaling to him that 
she’s not like the other people Lecter is forced to deal with. Crucially, she is not like Chilton—
cocky, self-absorbed, and oblivious to his own limitations. Rather, she is someone that deserves 
to be taken seriously and dealt with truthfully instead of toyed with and discarded. She stresses 
this by reminding Lecter that he had been truthful in their last meeting in Baltimore and implores 
him to continue. 
The uptake from Lecter is immediate and his tone shifts. He will be truthful with Starling, 
but If she insists on being taken seriously she will have to work to get the information she needs. 
In doing this, he takes on the role of an instructor or mentor whose job isn’t to merely deliver 
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answers to his pupil, but to help her find them on her own. He begins a pedagogical exercise that 
consists in quizzing and correcting Starling about Buffalo Bill’s nature: Bill covets, and all 
coveting, as it were, begins at home. The implication, which we will learn in the third act of the 
movie, is that Bill’s first murder was done close to where he first began to covet. So, if Starling 
wants to catch Bill, she has to figure out which murder was his first, and where it occurred.   
Mirroring the earlier game the two had played in Baltimore, Lecter interrupts his lesson 
to demand that Starling tell him about herself. 22 He forces her to return to the memories of her 
childhood: after the death of her father Clarice had been sent to live with a rancher and his wife 
in Montana; one day she ran away; Lecter wants to know why. Starling explains that on the day 
she ran away she woke up in the middle of the night to the sound of screams from the rancher’s 
barn. When she went to check on the noise, she saw that the screams were coming from the 
frightened lambs being slaughtered by the rancher. In an effort to save the lambs, the young 
Clarice tried to set them free by opening their enclosures, but paralyzed by fear, the animals 
remained still, continuing to scream. Out of desperation, Clarice grabbed a single lamb and ran 
as far away as she could. However, she was quickly picked up, the lamb was slaughtered, and 
she was sent away from the ranch to an orphanage. Here, Lecter, who had been interrupting the 
story with probing questions, asks Starling whether she still wakes up hearing the lambs 
screaming and if she thinks that saving Bill’s latest victim will make the lambs silent. Starling 
says that she doesn’t know and Lecter responds with a “thank you, Clarice. Thank you.” 
                                                          
22 I have in mind the “quid-pro-quo” scene from earlier in the movie in which Lecter, under the false pretense that 
his cooperation with Starling would improve his living conditions, agrees to answer her questions about Bill if she, 
in turn, will answer questions about her personal life. This scene can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlRLfbONYgM 
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At this point the two are interrupted as Dr. Chilton enters the room. Guards grab a hold of 
Agent Starling and begin to escort her out of the room. She begs Lecter to tell her Bill’s real 
name, but he seemingly refuses, offering her instead the case file that she had given him earlier. 
Starling breaks free from the guards and as she takes the file Lecter briefly grazes her finger—
the first and only time the two make any physical contact in the movie. 
The interaction between the two characters strikes me as an intimate one, but what makes 
it so is not immediately obvious.23 After all, Starling and Lecter do not fit the mold of people 
whom we tend to think of as intimates. Not only are they profoundly different people with 
profoundly different values and motivations (she’s an FBI agent—he’s a cannibal! Cue the 
sitcom music!), but the interaction also seems to be a rather unpleasant one—Starling is being 
grilled about her most painful memories by a serial killer so that she can stop another serial killer 
from killing again. Needless to say, it also seems inappropriate to describe the interaction 
between the two in terms of deep trust or loyalty. Nevertheless, there seems to be something 
oddly intimate at play here. What is it? 
This interaction, if it is indeed an intimate one, poses a particular challenge for Prager 
and Roberts’ account for two reasons. First, it’s not clear that Starling and Lecter meet its second 
condition; namely, it’s not clear that the interaction is one in which the two characters are in a 
state of positive involvement. More specifically, it’s not clear if the two have met the criterion 
for holding each other in basic positive regard. As pointed out earlier, part of this is due to the 
                                                          
23 I want to acknowledge that this interaction may not strike everyone as intimate. In what follows, I will try to 
explain what it is about the interaction that makes me see it this way, but, I admit, part of this will come down to 
intuition. Consequently, the reader who finds absolutely nothing intimate in this interaction may find this section 
frustrating. This is okay. If successful, the account of intimacy that I will offer in the next section will still be 
compatible with central cases of intimacy—it’s just that it will also allow for interactions like the one between 
Lecter and Starling to be intimate as well.   
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fact that we don’t quite know what it means for someone to hold someone in basic positive 
regard. If in the context of intimacy it means that both people like each other, or feel positively 
towards one another, then Lecter and Starling do not satisfy the criterion. While it’s not exactly 
clear whether Lecter likes Starling (he seems to have a favorable view of her at the end of the 
movie—at least favorable enough to tell her that he won’t kill her), it seems obvious that Starling 
does not like Lecter. She’s repulsed and frightened by his criminality and predatory nature—her 
strength is demonstrated in part because she is able to engage with Lecter despite the fact that 
she doesn’t like to be around him.   
Second, it’s not clear that the interaction in question satisfies condition iii). There is 
certainly understanding between the two characters. In forcing Clarice to divulge something very 
personal about herself, Lecter really does come to learn and understand something profound 
about Starling. When taken together with the earlier scene in Baltimore he learns that Clarice 
suffered a deep trauma at the death of her father, which she relived when she was unable to 
prevent the slaughter of the lambs. Both cases leave her with a sense that the suffering of the 
innocent could be prevented if she were stronger (better, smarter, in the right place, etc.). In turn, 
this lets Lecter understand why she’s so motivated to stop Bill, why she’s willing to put up with 
Lecter’s games, and why she tolerates the repeated sexism and objectification she encounters as 
a woman in the FBI.24 He gets the kind of understanding of her inner experience. She, however, 
does not gain any such insight from Lecter—the understanding that occurs between the two is 
decidedly one-sided. Given that Prager and Roberts’ condition iii) requires that both parties 
                                                          
24 This is an angle that, unfortunately, I’m unable to explore here, but which I think is very important to 
understanding the relationships between Starling and Lecter. Lecter is clearly the only male character in the movie 
that doesn’t objectify Starling. Lecter is ruthless and evil, but unlike Bill, Chilton, her FBI mentor, or the moth 
expert, he doesn’t take her sex as something to possess or manipulate. The only other male figure that we’re led to 
believe held the same position in Starling’s life is, of course, her father.    
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understand something about each other’s inner experience, it would appear that the interaction 
between Lecter and Starling cannot be intimate.  
IV. Identification, Empathy, and Recognition 
Let’s return to the question of what makes the interaction between Lecter and Starling 
intimate. It’s safe to say, I take it, that part of what makes it intimate can be explained by the fact 
that Starling shares something deeply personal about herself (even though she does this 
reluctantly) which lets Lecter understand something about her. Her disclosure and his 
understanding is of paramount importance. This much can be handled by the accounts we’ve 
discussed so far. However, two further elements also seem to matter: first, it matters that her 
personal divulgence occurs in a context in which she has demonstrated to Lecter that she is like 
him in one very important respect—her intelligence. This demonstration sets the tone between 
the two characters as two people who, if not exactly equals, are sufficiently alike with respect to 
their intellect to be considered in the same category.25 I will expand on why I think this is 
important shortly. The second element that seems important in this interaction is that Clarice 
(tacitly) acknowledges that Lecter really has understood something profound about her and he, in 
turn, acknowledges her acknowledgment of that fact. This mutual acknowledgment is subtle: 
                                                          
25 Their parity is also reflected in the way the scene is shot. At the beginning of the scene Clarice and Lecter are 
shown with the bars of Lecter’s cage between them, clearly demarcating them as occupying two different worlds. 
However, as soon as Clarice demonstrates to Lecter that she’s a worthy intellectual opponent and challenges him 
to take her seriously as one, the camera begins to zoom in. As the scene unfolds the bars retreat to the periphery 
and eventually disappear, and by the time Clarice is retelling the story of the lambs, all we see are two close-up 
shots of the characters’ faces. Their conversation has proverbially melted away the barrier between them and has 
left out the outside world; there is no cage, there are no guards, there’s only Starling and Lecter. The illusion is 
broken when Chillton enters the room and the camera zooms out to show the bars once again. 
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Clarice’s can be noted by the fact that she doesn’t protest (and seems to accept) Lecter’s 
interpretation of her story; Lecter’s can be noted in the thanks he gives in return.26 
Let’s return to the first element: why should the fact that Starling shows herself to be like 
Lecter in this limited respect matter (she is, after all very different from him in almost every 
other respect)? The answer to this question, I believe, partially had to do with how Lecter sees 
his own intellect and what effects this view has on how he relates to others. Clearly, Lecter is 
both aware of his own intellectual abilities, his intellectual superiority, and how his intellect sets 
him apart from other people. Simply put, his intelligence serves as a barrier that separates him 
from others. That’s not to say that he’s pained by this separation. Far from it, given his predatory 
nature, his condescending demander, and general disregard for human life, he is perfectly content 
to be separated in this way. Nevertheless, he is separated from others. Furthermore, his intellect 
is not some peripheral feature of his personality—it is something central to who he is, how he 
sees himself, and how he makes sense of the world.  
In recognizing Starling as sufficiently like him precisely with respect to this feature, two 
things happen. First, the barrier that is usually present between Lecter and the rest of the world is 
partially lifted for Clarice. He is no longer alone on one side, apart from everyone else; Starling 
is there with him. And second, because the feature that allows him to partially identify with her 
is so central to how Lecter sees himself, he is able to partially take on Starling's perspective. 
                                                          
26 Lecter: And you think, if you save poor Catherine, you could make them stop, don't you? You think if Catherine 
lives, you won't wake up in the dark ever again to that awful screaming of the lambs. 
Starling: I don’t know. I don’t know. 
Lecter: Thank you, Clarice. 
 
The thank you here is ambiguous, but as I’m interpreting it, it is a thank you for letting him understand what drives 
her. 
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Crucially, being able to see Starling in this way allows for a degree of empathy in Lecter 
that, up to this point, has been missing. In turn, this degree of empathy matters because it 
changes the way Lecter understands what Starling divulges. He doesn’t simply identify that 
Starling has certain emotions, motivations, and drives—this is something that he is very good at 
doing, something that he’s been able to pick up from Clarice since their first meeting, and 
something that we are led to believe he employs often to exploit the people around him. Rather, 
he comes as close as he possibly can given his psychopathy, to actually identifying with those 
motivations, emotions, and drives. In that sense, he comes as close as he can to having an 
understanding of Clarice from her point of view.  
I don’t mean to overstate this point: the degree to which he is able to identify with 
Starling is very limited. It’s neither the case that he comes to think of himself as Clarice would 
think of herself, nor does he come to actually feel what Starling felt, recalling the crying of the 
lambs—he is, I take it, incapable of sympathy. That being said, I do think that he’s able to see 
some vague outline—a cast shadow—of what that feeling might be like and that he is able to do 
this only because he comes to think of Starling as like him in this limited, but central to his own 
self-understanding, way.  
The suggestion I’m proposing then, is that part of what makes the interaction between the 
two intimate is the fact that the understanding Lecter comes to have of Starling is mediated by 
the empathy (however limited it may be) he has for her in the scene. In turn, I want to explain 
how this occurs by appealing to the common feature that he identifies between himself and her. 
In other words, their similarity with respect to intellect matters in this interaction because it 
serves as the basis on which Lecter first identifies with Starling. This identification, in turn, 
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matters because it allows for a degree of empathy, which lets him gain a deep understanding of 
Clarice.  
More generally, I want to say that an element of intimate interactions is the presence of at 
least some empathy by one (or both) of the people in an interaction that allows for what’s being 
shared in that interaction to be understood by the empathetic person in a particular way. Namely, 
it allows for understanding of what’s being shared by partially taking on the viewpoint of the 
person sharing it.  
The other element that I’ve said matters in making the interaction between Lecter and 
Starling an intimate one is the fact that there is a kind of mutual recognition between the two. 
Starling acknowledges that Lecter has come to have a kind of deep understanding of her, and he 
recognizes her acknowledgment. This element is important primarily because it serves as a signal 
to both people in the interaction that there really has been genuine understanding between the 
two. It is a kind of mark of success that is weaker than a requirement for mutual understanding 
on both parts, but that serves to let both parties in the interaction know that what’s been shared 
has been shared successfully. Consider how different their interaction would have been had 
Starling failed to notice that Lecter understood what motivates her, or, alternatively, if she had 
protested his understanding, insisting that he had misunderstood her. It seems to me that in both 
cases the degree of intimacy in the interaction would have been diminished or non-existent.  
 This element also plays a particularly important part in the interaction between Lecter 
and Starling for a different reason that's important to distinguish here. Part of what makes the 
notion that something intimate is happening in the interaction between Starling and Lecter so 
unsettling and difficult to explain is due to the fact that Starling is clearly under duress when 
being interrogated by Lecter. She doesn’t want to be asked questions about the death of her 
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father or about the slaughter of the lambs and she only does so because Lecter has something that 
she needs. Nor does she seem to want to be understood by Lecter. In other words, it seems that 
he understands her against her will. In most cases, this lack of consent is enough to render 
intimacy in an interaction null. I think this is generally true, and I think it would have also been 
true in this case as well but for the fact that Clarice’s acknowledgement that she has been 
understood seems to mitigate it. In a sense, then, her acknowledgment of his understanding 
serves as a very weak kind of retroactive consent to be understood—what was done was under 
duress, but it wasn't an overriding violation.  
That being said, most cases of intimate interactions do not involve the kind of duress that 
Clarice experiences in sharing her story. For those cases it is sufficient that one simply engages 
in sharing freely for this baseline consent to be established. In that sense, to share with someone 
is a de facto way of consenting and inviting the other to understand something. In those cases I 
maintain that the mutual recognition of understanding serves merely as a way to signify to the 
other that what one has set out to share with the other has been achieved.  
In that respect, it's possible to think of this second element as a further refinement of 
Prager and Roberts' 'engagement' condition. Recall, on that account, intimacy required that one 
be attentive and involved with the activity that constituted the interaction. This seems correct—
distraction and disinterest are anathema to intimacy—and the element of mutual recognition of 
understanding can be seen as a way of signaling to the other that one is, in fact, involved.   
 Let’s take stock. In the last section I tried to show that the interaction between Lecter and 
Starling presents a challenge for more sophisticated views of intimate interactions. This 
interaction seems to be intimate despite the fact that it doesn’t fit the standard mold of an 
intimate interaction: the characters don’t’ particularly like each other, and not only is the 
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interaction between them asymmetrical insofar as only Starling divulges anything person about 
herself, but it is also asymmetrical insofar as she doesn’t come to understand anything about 
Lecter. On Strikwerda and May’s theory (extended from their theory about intimacy between 
friends) this wouldn’t count as an intimate interaction and Prager and Roberts’ account doesn’t 
easily accommodate it as long as the view remains committed to an element of mutual 
divulgence and an unclear standard of basic positive regard.  
In this section I’ve tried to account for the difficulty presented by the interaction between 
Lecter and Starling by stressing the importance of two elements. The first is the presence of 
some degree of empathy on behalf of Lecter that allows him to understand the personal matters 
that Starling is divulging. More specifically, by exhibiting some degree of empathy for Starling 
prior to her telling him the story of the lambs, Lecter is able to at least partially occupy her 
viewpoint of the world and come to understand what she’s sharing with him, her motivations and 
her drive for justice from her point of view. The second element is the presence of a recognition 
by Starling that Lecter has understood her, and an acknowledgement on his behalf that she has 
recognized this.  
Putting everything together and generalizing, then, we can say that generally an 
interaction is intimate if: 
i) One individual (or both) shares something either verbally or nonverbally with the 
other 
ii) There is some degree of empathy on the part of the person with whom that 
something is shared (or both if both are sharing something) 
iii) As a result, one individual (or both) comes to understand what’s being shared at 
least partially through adopting the viewpoint of the other 
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iv) There is a shared recognition that this understanding has occurred 
I’ve argued that this way of thinking of intimacy can handle difficult cases like the one between 
Lecter and Starling. In the next section I will show that the similarities between my account and 
the ones we discussed earlier are sufficiently similar to capture everything that made those 
accounts seem promising. Thus, we lose nothing by adopting my view and may even gain a 
greater understanding of what’s right about the other accounts. I will close off the paper by 
considering some remaining questions and further areas worth considering. 
V. A Look Back (and Ahead) 
The first thing to note is that the account I’ve presented isn’t radically different from the 
ones we examined earlier. In fact, the four accounts share quite a bit in common. All four, for 
example, share the notion that an interaction has to involve some kind of disclosure or sharing 
that occurs between the people involved. However, each varies with respect to what must be 
shared and how it must be shared. The common view held that something personal has to be 
disclosed verbally; Strikwerda and May held that it has to be some core characteristic feature 
disclosed either verbally or nonverbally; Prager and Roberts held that it must be a feature of the 
other’s inner experience shared either verbally or nonverbally. My view holds that disclosure can 
happen either verbally or nonverbally but so far I’ve remained uncommitted about the content of 
what’s being shared. My suspicion is that what’s being shared is less important than the other 
elements I’ve discussed. However, I’ve given no argument for that claim, so I will settle for 
saying that my view is open to accommodating inner experiences, characteristic features, and 
deep personal aspirations, feelings, and drives as equally good subjects for divulgence. In this 
respect, my view is perfectly compatible with the rest.  
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Rather than focusing on what’s being disclosed, my account looks at the conditions under 
which the disclosure occurs. Here, it departs from the other three which all take seriously the 
notion that the people involved must, in some sense, think about each other in a positive light. 
The common view holds that the individuals must like each other; Strikwerda and May’s view 
holds that they must trust and be loyal to one another; and Prager and Roberts’ view holds that 
they must have a basic positive regard for one another. In contrast, my view states that there 
must be some degree of empathy present in the person with whom information is being shared. 
This, I’ve argued, allows one (or both) parties to understand what’s being shared from the 
perspective of the other. Since being empathetic doesn’t require that one view the other person in 
a positive light, but, at the same time allows for that possibility, my account can account for 
those cases in which the people in question do feel positively towards one another, as well as 
more difficult cases in which they don’t (i.e. the boxing case and Lecter and Starling’s 
interaction). In other words, the conditions under which disclosure must occur are more relaxed 
than those of the other accounts. 
The focus on understanding is also present in the two sophisticated views of intimacy we 
looked at. Both Strikwerda and May and Prager and Roberts stress that some kind of 
understanding must occur between the individuals. The former put this in terms of a deep mutual 
knowledge that allows for an understanding of the other and oneself, and the latter put it in terms 
of a shared understanding of one another’s selves. My account differs from these in two respects. 
First, it doesn’t require that the understanding be mutual—the understanding that occurs may be 
asymmetrical. However, it does require that both people recognize that this understanding has 
occurred. This condition, too, is weaker than the one offered by the previous accounts. 
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The weakening of these last two elements of intimate interactions is what allows my 
account to accommodate the difficult case presented by Starling and Lecter’s interaction. At the 
same time, however, the account is similar enough to the previous three accounts to also capture 
what made the other theories plausible. It can still explain why talking about personal things 
between people who care about each other is important when it comes to intimacy; viz., such 
interactions are likely to be ones in which the elements I’ve specified are likely to be present. But 
it can also explain why talking doesn’t always result in intimacy (the other person many not be 
empathetic in the least, or they may not understand what you’re sharing, or you may not 
recognize that they’ve understood!). Likewise, my account can still take on board the importance 
that Strikwerda and May place on trust and loyalty in intimacy between friends—nothing in my 
view excludes this possibility. But it can also explain how there can be intimate interactions that 
can occur between people who fall short of full blown trust and loyalty. Finally, my account can 
still grant that the mutual understanding and positive regard specified by Prager and Roberts is 
important while allowing that there may be cases in which intimacy occurs despite the fact that 
the understanding achieved is one-sided, and despite the fact that there may be little positive 
regard in play during the interaction. If what I’ve said here is right, then adopting my account 
gives us a more nuanced understanding of the nature of intimate interactions. 
That being said, the account I've offered here is by no means a full account of intimacy. 
Even with respect to intimate interactions, there are still some questions that remain unanswered. 
For example, I have not given a full account of the mechanism by which identification with a 
particular feature can lead to empathy with a person. I've assumed that it's enough to identify 
empathy as an important element of intimate interactions and to give a (seemingly) plausible 
mechanism of how this empathy might be engendered (i.e. empathy by way of identification) 
  
 
31 
 
through a specific example while simultaneously passing the buck of how empathy actually 
works to other theorists. The seemingly plausible mechanism I've proposed may turn out to be 
very different from the way people come to feel empathy for one another—in that case, my 
account will have to be modified. 
Likewise, I do not take myself to have identified all the features that may be relevant in 
making an interaction intimate. I have not, for example, addressed the role that touch can play in 
making an interaction intimate. Nor have I talked about the role of anxiety, judgment, or 
comfort. More generally, I have remained silent on how we should interpret nonverbal disclosure 
and the different forms it can take; rather, I have simply assumed that this kind of disclosure is 
common and intuitive and have simply incorporated it into my account. This is not an 
assumption that should be taken lightly—the conditions under which nonverbal disclosure occurs 
may themselves be crucial to understanding how we should understand intimacy. 
Finally, and most notably, I have said nothing about the role of intimacy in loving 
relationships or friendships. The big questions that spurred this exploration of the intimate 
landscape remain unanswered. Nevertheless, I hope that what has been said here can serve as a 
stepping stone towards a broader theory that may be better disposed to answer them.   
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